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Source file src/crypto/aes/aes_gcm.go

Documentation: crypto/aes

     1  // Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
     2  // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
     3  // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
     4  
     5  //go:build amd64 || arm64
     6  // +build amd64 arm64
     7  
     8  package aes
     9  
    10  import (
    11  	"crypto/cipher"
    12  	subtleoverlap "crypto/internal/subtle"
    13  	"crypto/subtle"
    14  	"errors"
    15  )
    16  
    17  // The following functions are defined in gcm_*.s.
    18  
    19  //go:noescape
    20  func gcmAesInit(productTable *[256]byte, ks []uint32)
    21  
    22  //go:noescape
    23  func gcmAesData(productTable *[256]byte, data []byte, T *[16]byte)
    24  
    25  //go:noescape
    26  func gcmAesEnc(productTable *[256]byte, dst, src []byte, ctr, T *[16]byte, ks []uint32)
    27  
    28  //go:noescape
    29  func gcmAesDec(productTable *[256]byte, dst, src []byte, ctr, T *[16]byte, ks []uint32)
    30  
    31  //go:noescape
    32  func gcmAesFinish(productTable *[256]byte, tagMask, T *[16]byte, pLen, dLen uint64)
    33  
    34  const (
    35  	gcmBlockSize         = 16
    36  	gcmTagSize           = 16
    37  	gcmMinimumTagSize    = 12 // NIST SP 800-38D recommends tags with 12 or more bytes.
    38  	gcmStandardNonceSize = 12
    39  )
    40  
    41  var errOpen = errors.New("cipher: message authentication failed")
    42  
    43  // aesCipherGCM implements crypto/cipher.gcmAble so that crypto/cipher.NewGCM
    44  // will use the optimised implementation in this file when possible. Instances
    45  // of this type only exist when hasGCMAsm returns true.
    46  type aesCipherGCM struct {
    47  	aesCipherAsm
    48  }
    49  
    50  // Assert that aesCipherGCM implements the gcmAble interface.
    51  var _ gcmAble = (*aesCipherGCM)(nil)
    52  
    53  // NewGCM returns the AES cipher wrapped in Galois Counter Mode. This is only
    54  // called by crypto/cipher.NewGCM via the gcmAble interface.
    55  func (c *aesCipherGCM) NewGCM(nonceSize, tagSize int) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
    56  	g := &gcmAsm{ks: c.enc, nonceSize: nonceSize, tagSize: tagSize}
    57  	gcmAesInit(&g.productTable, g.ks)
    58  	return g, nil
    59  }
    60  
    61  type gcmAsm struct {
    62  	// ks is the key schedule, the length of which depends on the size of
    63  	// the AES key.
    64  	ks []uint32
    65  	// productTable contains pre-computed multiples of the binary-field
    66  	// element used in GHASH.
    67  	productTable [256]byte
    68  	// nonceSize contains the expected size of the nonce, in bytes.
    69  	nonceSize int
    70  	// tagSize contains the size of the tag, in bytes.
    71  	tagSize int
    72  }
    73  
    74  func (g *gcmAsm) NonceSize() int {
    75  	return g.nonceSize
    76  }
    77  
    78  func (g *gcmAsm) Overhead() int {
    79  	return g.tagSize
    80  }
    81  
    82  // sliceForAppend takes a slice and a requested number of bytes. It returns a
    83  // slice with the contents of the given slice followed by that many bytes and a
    84  // second slice that aliases into it and contains only the extra bytes. If the
    85  // original slice has sufficient capacity then no allocation is performed.
    86  func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) {
    87  	if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total {
    88  		head = in[:total]
    89  	} else {
    90  		head = make([]byte, total)
    91  		copy(head, in)
    92  	}
    93  	tail = head[len(in):]
    94  	return
    95  }
    96  
    97  // Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext. See the cipher.AEAD interface for
    98  // details.
    99  func (g *gcmAsm) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
   100  	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
   101  		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
   102  	}
   103  	if uint64(len(plaintext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*BlockSize {
   104  		panic("crypto/cipher: message too large for GCM")
   105  	}
   106  
   107  	var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
   108  
   109  	if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize {
   110  		// Init counter to nonce||1
   111  		copy(counter[:], nonce)
   112  		counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1
   113  	} else {
   114  		// Otherwise counter = GHASH(nonce)
   115  		gcmAesData(&g.productTable, nonce, &counter)
   116  		gcmAesFinish(&g.productTable, &tagMask, &counter, uint64(len(nonce)), uint64(0))
   117  	}
   118  
   119  	encryptBlockAsm(len(g.ks)/4-1, &g.ks[0], &tagMask[0], &counter[0])
   120  
   121  	var tagOut [gcmTagSize]byte
   122  	gcmAesData(&g.productTable, data, &tagOut)
   123  
   124  	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+g.tagSize)
   125  	if subtleoverlap.InexactOverlap(out[:len(plaintext)], plaintext) {
   126  		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
   127  	}
   128  	if len(plaintext) > 0 {
   129  		gcmAesEnc(&g.productTable, out, plaintext, &counter, &tagOut, g.ks)
   130  	}
   131  	gcmAesFinish(&g.productTable, &tagMask, &tagOut, uint64(len(plaintext)), uint64(len(data)))
   132  	copy(out[len(plaintext):], tagOut[:])
   133  
   134  	return ret
   135  }
   136  
   137  // Open authenticates and decrypts ciphertext. See the cipher.AEAD interface
   138  // for details.
   139  func (g *gcmAsm) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
   140  	if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize {
   141  		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
   142  	}
   143  	// Sanity check to prevent the authentication from always succeeding if an implementation
   144  	// leaves tagSize uninitialized, for example.
   145  	if g.tagSize < gcmMinimumTagSize {
   146  		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect GCM tag size")
   147  	}
   148  
   149  	if len(ciphertext) < g.tagSize {
   150  		return nil, errOpen
   151  	}
   152  	if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(BlockSize)+uint64(g.tagSize) {
   153  		return nil, errOpen
   154  	}
   155  
   156  	tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize:]
   157  	ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize]
   158  
   159  	// See GCM spec, section 7.1.
   160  	var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
   161  
   162  	if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize {
   163  		// Init counter to nonce||1
   164  		copy(counter[:], nonce)
   165  		counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1
   166  	} else {
   167  		// Otherwise counter = GHASH(nonce)
   168  		gcmAesData(&g.productTable, nonce, &counter)
   169  		gcmAesFinish(&g.productTable, &tagMask, &counter, uint64(len(nonce)), uint64(0))
   170  	}
   171  
   172  	encryptBlockAsm(len(g.ks)/4-1, &g.ks[0], &tagMask[0], &counter[0])
   173  
   174  	var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte
   175  	gcmAesData(&g.productTable, data, &expectedTag)
   176  
   177  	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
   178  	if subtleoverlap.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) {
   179  		panic("crypto/cipher: invalid buffer overlap")
   180  	}
   181  	if len(ciphertext) > 0 {
   182  		gcmAesDec(&g.productTable, out, ciphertext, &counter, &expectedTag, g.ks)
   183  	}
   184  	gcmAesFinish(&g.productTable, &tagMask, &expectedTag, uint64(len(ciphertext)), uint64(len(data)))
   185  
   186  	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:g.tagSize], tag) != 1 {
   187  		for i := range out {
   188  			out[i] = 0
   189  		}
   190  		return nil, errOpen
   191  	}
   192  
   193  	return ret, nil
   194  }
   195  

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